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BOOK REVIEW
HARTOG'S NEW YORK AND THE IDEOLOGY OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
ELIZABETH MENSCH*

By the end of the nineteenth century American jurists regarded the
distinction between public and private as a perfectly obvious fact of
nature: as there was day and night, land'and sea, sun and moon, so too
was there public and private. As Hendrick Hartog's aptly titled book,
Public Property and Private Power,1 reminds us, however, it was not

always so. The distinction which seemed so self-evident by the twentieth
century was barely imaginable during most of the eighteenth, and the
conceptual transformation which led the vocabulary of public and private to dominate American legal thought proceeded only by way of a
convoluted series of steps.
While a number of writers have recently emphasized the eventual
ideological significance of the public/private distinction,2 Hartog's
book makes a unique contribution by tracing in detail the complex process of its early historical evolution, and also by showing that evolution
within the context of a single legally constituted body-the corporation
of the city of New York. Through this careful focus Hartog examines
the complex interplay between broad ideological change and the particulars of local political and economic decision-making. Along the way
he also tells some fascinating stories about a city which Americans have
sometimes glamorized but (perhaps wisely) never quite trusted.
By the very richness of its specific detail, however, Hartog's account raises complex questions of interpretation which would never
have emerged if his book had been, like most legal histories, simply a
*
Professor of Law, SUNY College of Law, Buffalo. B.A. 1965, New Sch. for Social Res.;
M.A.T. 1967, Cornell; J.D. 1978, Buffalo; L.L.M. 1979, Harvard.
1. H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983).
2. See, e.g., articles by Paul Brest, Gerald Frug, Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy,
and Karl Klare in the Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Symposium]. The classic (and, I think, still the best) statement on the ideology
of public and private is K. MARX, "ON THE JEWISH QUESTION," EARLY WRITINGS (1843) (Livingstone trans. 1975). For some modern analyses of law as ideology in general, see The Special Issue
on Law, Ideology and Social Research, 9 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 3-87 (1985). For an anthology that
captures the contemporary debate about law and ideology as they relate to the Marxist tradition in
a spirit of fullness and diversity, see LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE (D. Sugarman, ed. 1983).
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description of doctrinal change.' In fact, Hartog's account of New
York's legal history lends itself to two quite different interpretations.
The first, which might be called the liberal functionalist approach, represents the tradition in legal history of pluralist, instrumentalist, and
reformist perspectives. The liberal aspect is the belief in the existence of
knowable categories, such as the "public sphere," or the "private market." Moreover, on the functional side, these categories are described as
serving socially useful purposes, and as changing in response to changes
in technology or changes in the "needs" of "society." While legal categories can thus be reduced to some extent to expressions of underlying
political or economic goals or agendas, those are seen as basically neutral and separate from particularities of power in the social world.
Therefore, one can talk meaningfully about the "public interest," or the
"public purpose of facilitating economic development. '
A second approach, which might be called the contingent yet ideological approach, emphasizes the chosen and constructed (and therefore contingent) dimension of social reality, while also recognizing that
realities of power in the world, especially class power, distort and shape
the content of perceived social reality. Thus the categories which the
liberal account takes to be real are in fact ideological constructs rather
than objective descriptions of reality. This approach is also opposed to
functionalism inasmuch as it rejects the reductionism, neatness, and linearity of functionalist accounts. People in history are active living subjects, not mere reflexive objects of impersonal institutions; and they
fashion their constructions of reality over time, drawing on their dayto-day experience in doing so. At the same time, choices are not free,
whimsical and unconstrained by social forces. Instead, the reality of
social power belies the existence of a "public interest" or "public purposes." Take a world of conflict, of struggle, of recurring winners (e.g.,
the ruling class) and losers (e.g., the poor, the underclass) and allow the
contingency of social perception to flow through, and you have this
second approach, one whose existence might surprise Hartog a little,
yet finds itself persuasively presented in his book.
My view is that Hartog's book provides, although not always
unambiguously, rich material for the second interpretative view. The
story Hartog tells is about the contingency of the abstract categories by
which New York City defined itself, and also, simultaneously, about
3. Straight doctrinal history now has both a conservative and critical mode. The former
was well described by Morton Horwitz (Horwitz, Book Review, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973))
as essentially constituting an apology of the existing legal/social order, by its implicit appeal to
tradition and order. For a description of some of the latter, see Gordon, Critical Legal Histories,
36 STAN. L.REV.57 (1984), especially 114-25.
4. This is a very crudely outlined version. For a far more thorough and elegant analysis,
see Gordon, supra note 3.
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how those categories influenced the way city officials conceived of their
roles and fashioned the future of their city. A brief summary of the
book illustrates that point.
The first part of Hartog's book, describing New York City before
the Revolution, shows a mode of thinking and governance which we
would now, looking back, describe as a blend of public and private.'
Property still carried with it connotations of sovereignty, and therefore
of "public" obligation, while political authority was seen as linked to
control over property. Thus, under the old Montgomery Charter (New
York City's corporate charter from the crown) New York's uniquely
privileged status among provincial cities derived directly from the immense land grant that was part of the city's charter.6 City officials
viewed the management of city real estate as their chief job, and
achieved their planning goals by exercising what we would now consider the rights of private ownership. 7 As a key example, city officials
commenced the development of the city's waterfront by conveying
waterlots to (usually contiguous) owners with conditions of development and maintenance attached, usually in the form of covenants running with the land. The obligations thus imposed were heavy, 8 but the
lots were often highly profitable. Even then, some early liberals claimed
"corruption," especially when the lots were granted to members of the
Common Council, but that notion of corruption presupposes a separaadvantage which
tion between public welfare and private economic
9
most people would have found unintelligible.
After the Revolution this essentially hierarchical union ofproperty
and political power was challenged by the egalitarianism implicit in
radical republicanism. The Corporation of New York City, with its
crown charter and obvious wealth, was suspect in a society which now
supposedly disdained special advantages; corporations in general, and
New York in particular, were viewed as illegitimate vestiges of crown
rule. " Under pressure from this change in the prevailing ideology, New
York City officials were forced to find a new source of legitimacy. They
did this by reconceptualizing their authority as being derived from a
5.

H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 17.

6. As Hartog points out, New York's political character was inseparable from its property-the latter created the former. See id. at 23.
7. Id. at 40.
8. Id. at 50.
9. Id. at 46-49.
10. Id. at 85-88. See also E. COUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION 1760-1790, at 54
(1981)

and D. MILLER, JACKSONIAN ARISTROCRACY: CLASS AND DEMOCRACY IN NEW YORK 1830-

1860 at 34 (1967). See generally W. MCLOUGHLIN, REVIVALS, AWAKENINGS, AND REFORM: AN
ESSAY IN RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 1607-1977 (1978); Moorhead, Between Progressand Apocalypse, 71 J. AM. HIST. 524 (1984); E. SPAULDING, NEW YORK IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD (1932); G. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE (1979).
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state delegation of specifically public power rather than from crownconferred property and privileges. In theory, their power now flowed
from the sovereign people, the ultimate republican source of legitimacy.
The second part of Hartog's book traces the sometimes halting
process by which city officials refined and acted upon their new selfdefinition. The city was conceived to have both a public (state agent)
and private (property owning) side." City leaders downplayed the private side, in particular by selling off much of the city's property, 2 while
they simultaneously expanded the range of services which were now
defined as peculiarly public.' 3 Street cleaning and maintenance, for example, once a responsibility of land ownership, was now considered a
14
public concern and taxes were collected to pay for it directly.
One of Hartog's key points is that this change in self-perception
and its accompanying change in mode of governing took place well
before cities had been declared agents of the state by the dominant legal
culture.' 5 The change brought paradoxical results. For a time it led
officials to enlarge their conception of legitimate activity, for as they
acted in the name of the people, they felt both empowered and obligated to direct activities that had once seemed outside the scope of their
old and restrictive identity as real estate managers.' 6 The expansive
goal of the public sphere was to promote change and progress. Yet this
new legitimacy was purchased at a price. As they appealed to the State
of New York to legitimate the authority they exercised, city officials
also implicitly undercut the theoretical autonomy that property once
provided. Conceptually they were now servants of the state, limited to
doing only what the state authorized. For a time that theoretical serviII. This dual character was elaborated in the famous church cemetery cases, especially
Brick Presbyterian Church v. The Mayor of New York, 5 Cowen's 538 (1826). See H. HARTOG,
supra note I, at 78-81.
12. Id.at 109.
13. See, e.g., id. at 77.
14. Id.at 93, 145. Direct collection of taxes to provide the chief source of income (rather
than management of land and other "properties", like monopolies) seems to mark a key move in
the emergence of a government conceived to be a "state." See Rose, Book Review, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 216, 218-21 (1984). The idea of "the state" was itself the result of a complex conceptual
development; the first real formulation is probably to be found in Bodin. (See Q. SKINNER, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1972).) The effect of Skinner's history of political
theory is to show that "the state," like this public/private distinction, is itself a contingent social
construct rather than a "thing." See also Gable, Phenomonology of Rights Consciousnessand the
Pact ofthe Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563 (1984). For an attempt to develop a sophisticated contemporary Marxist account of the state, with autonomous capacity, that is not excessively contingent, see T. SKOLPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS (1984).

15. This is in contrast to Gerald Frug's emphasis on the dominant ideology's effect on
the idea of the cities: Frug stresses the imposition of general ideological norms, whereas Hartog
stresses the city's changing self-conception. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1057 (1980) and H. HARTOG, supra note 1,at 7-9.

16. The emphasis came to be on actively promoting change, not just maintaining stability. H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 203.
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tude seemed not to matter, for the reality of state politics was such that
city officials basically got whatever authorization they requested from
state legislators. 17 In time, however, as legal imagery refined the notion
of the city's subservience to the state, even originally powerful cities like
New York found their power curtailed by the assumption that they
could exercise only state-delegated authority. Hartog starts the book, in
fact, by describing his own frustration when he worked with the Lindsay administration trying to eliminate leaded paint hazards: in a very
real sense he was blocked by perverse public/private notions which people could not transcend for the sake of simply getting a job done.'"
The last third of Hartog's book.traces the evolution of the modern
legal definition of the city. While New Yorkers had already discovered
that they had both a public and private side, for the most part public/
private distinctions had not yet divided corporations into separate categories: a corporation was any group that had become a "juristic" person, a category which lumped cities together with, for example, both
business and ecclesiastical corporations. 9 Then, in 1819, the famous
Dartmouth College case2" officially separated municipal corporations,
which were public and exercised rights derived from the state, from private corporations, which had rights as against the state. Once that key
distinction had been articulated, it began to seem perfectly clear that
New York City, despite its charter and "private" (property owning)
side, belonged in a uniform category with other ("public") municipalities. By the 1840's the notion that the city's charter provided any protection at all from the state could be dismissed as absurd. 2 '
As a final irony, however, the same judiciary that was determined
to name cities mere agents of the states was also reluctant to concede to
these "little republics" the full range of privileges and immunities enjoyed by the states. Municipal government implied unruly city mobs
and crude political corruption. In the face of the city's threat to decency
and order, judges viewed themselves as guardians of private right and
public morality-as Hartog says, a kind of judicial YMCA.22
Seeking doctrinal justification for overseeing the acts of municipal
corporations, judges began to liken cities in some respects to private
entities. Courts subjected cities' delegated authority to strict statutory
construction as interpreted according to "objective" (court created)
standards, and held them liable as acting "privately" (rather than with
17.
18.
19.
20.
H. HARTOG,
21.
22.

Id. at 98.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 185, 186.
The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518 (U.S. 1819). See
supra note 1, at 192-95.
H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 116.
Id. at 222.
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state immunity) when they infringed on private rights.2" The effect was
a municipal government subject to both state and judicial power. Finally, in the 1840's the Corporation of the City of New York lost its last
vestige of autonomy. After long political struggle with Brooklyn, the
corporation lost its control over the Brooklyn ferry franchise. This
franchise, which Chancellor Kent had once announced quite clearly belonged to the city's "private" side, protected from state control, was
now declared "public" and wholly subject to legislative authority.2 4
Notably, it is difficult to tell this story even in a brief outline without, as it were, falling into bad habits. Categories like "the state," and
"public services" begin to take on a life of their own. City officials expand their "sphere," the "state" exerts control over "the city," "private
rights" are protected by "the judiciary," etc. One of the challenges of
historical interpretation is to describe actual and important concrete
changes (waterlots got filled in, shipping increased, streets were laid,
cleaned and maintained through a process of taxation and salaried payment of workers, etc.) without describing those changes in the abstract
terms that were used to justify them (e.g. state action used to promote a
public purpose). People do concrete things-the "state" does not "exercise police power." On the other hand, as Hartog's book demonstrates
so well, the social choices that are made so that things get done in a
particular way fashion the way people conceive of their roles and of the
power they exercise. Thus city officials who think of their corporation
as essentially public feel uncomfortable with owning property, while
they also feel obligated to take charge of city streets in order to "promote development." The categories are not real, but they have everything to do with the way people behave.
Of course there is a long and sophisticated body of social theory
which attempts to point to the relationship between social/economic
change and the law by drawing more fully on familiar abstract catego23. Id. at 219-29. Then, in Mayor of New York City v. Furze, 3 Hill 612 (1842), the city
was held liable on the theory that it was public. As Hartog makes quite clear, the point was not
that activities were either public or private, but rather that the categories were manipulated easily
to justify judicial overview. See H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 228-30.
24. H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 240-58.
25. For a sense of the continuing debate among social theorists over these issues, which
encompasses both a liberal preoccupation with functionalism and its credible alternatives, with a
principal focus on the work of Max Weber, and a similar Marxist preoccupation with the relationship between the economic "base" and the legal and ideological superstructure, see H. COLLINS,
MARXISM AND LAW (1984), LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE, Intro., Ch. I & 4, 60-94 (D.
Sugarman, ed. 1983); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975) 258-269; R. UNGER, LAW &
MODERN SOCIETY (1976); A. GOULDNER, THE Two MARXISMS (1980); D. Trubeck, Complexity and
Contradiction in the Legal Order, I I LAW Soc. REV. 529 (1977); D. Trubeck, Max Weber's Tragic
Modernism and the Study of Law in Society, 3 INST. LEGAL STUDIES WORKING PAPERS (1985); A.
Fraser, The Legal Theory We Need Now 40-41 SOCIALIST REV. 147 (1978); K. Klare, Lawmaking as
Praxis,40 TELOS 123 (Summer 1979).
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ries.2" At times, as when he cites to Weber, 2 6 Hartog draws suggestively from that literature. Put crudely, the more functional account
that might be suggested by such theorists would run roughly as follows:
by the end of the eighteenth century the needs of a developing private
commercial economy created pressure for an expanded public sphere
devoted to establishing the conditions necessary for economic progress.
At first city officials responded by creatively using their somewhat restrictive charter authority, managing corporate property so as to insure
the development of the waterfront. Although this certainly constituted
an example of official inventiveness, the confines of eighteenth century
modes of governing made it impossible for government to fully serve
public and commercial needs in an advanced economy. Those confines
were therefore rejected in favor of the creation of an active public
sphere to provide the rationalized bureaucratic framework within
which a private capitalist economy could thrive. While this whole process took place to a minor degree within New York City, the city itself
was eventually submerged by the need for more centralized state action;
the need for a real nation state superseded the need for various localized
municipal spheres. An increasingly rationalized legal system followed
suit by uniformly defining local municipalities as mere agents of state
power, with no claim to either autonomy or uniqueness.
Functionalist notions like "rationalized public state action" are so
commonplace and so much a part of our vocabulary that it is difficult
not to think in terms of them. Moreover, they often provide a shorthand to describe things that did in fact happen. There were certain concrete changes in modes of governing that took place around the end of
the eighteenth century, in New York City and elsewhere. 2 7 Those
changes may have helped effect certain social choices-for instance, to
make New York a good port for shippers. Nevertheless, much of
Hartog's description actually serves to illustrate the misleading nature
of abstract ideological categories, and therefore of the functionalist account of historical change. It may be worth demonstrating that point
by stressing two separate problems: the problem of incoherence and the
problem of social conflict.
26. See H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 145 n.12.
27. For a sophisticated review of Hartog's book, which points comparatively to developments in Europe, see Rose, Book Review, 79 Nw. L. REV. 216 (1984). Rose stresses Weberian
notions like rationalization, but for the most part does so without excessive reification of the kind I
am criticizing here.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
A. Incoherence

It has now become relatively commonplace to demonstrate the incoherence of the distinction between public and private: 28 doing so
once again is like beating a dead horse. Nevertheless, the point may be
worth emphasizing once more only because one of the strengths of
Hartog's book lies in its often quite clever description of exactly how
indeterminate, and hence perfectly mobile, those categories really are.
Hartog makes that point in part by showing the utter contingency
and conventionality of the categories. He starts by recreating a time
when people ran cities and even owned property without seeming to
make the distinction at all: people did things with land without necessarily thinking of themselves as either exercising "private rights" or performing "public functions. ,29
As Hartog demonstrates, even after the prevailing culture had decided that the public/private distinction existed, the absence of longstanding convention meant there was no clear basis upon which to decide exactly what was public and what was private. The particular distributions, which often switched quite rapidly, were almost comically
arbitrary. In 1784, for example, the Council of Revision seemed satisfied that all corporations, municipal as well as business and ecclesiastical, were by their nature essentially private,3" while of course the Jeffersonians regarded all corporations as quite obviously public. 3 The
great division executed by Dartmouth College was at the time less than
settled fact.
While before Dartmouth College New York City had already
found its corporate body divided into separate public and private sides,
that division had simply raised further troublesome questions about
which functions were to be considered public and which private. Land
ownership became clearly private and therefore peripheral to an increasingly public corporation, although in the eighteenth century it was
the city's real estate which more than anything else defined its unique
character. Other "offices" (which included the right to collect fees and
profits) guaranteed under the charter, such as gauger of liquors, measurer of grains, packer of various foods, etc., seemed harder to categorize: even by 1836 Chancellor Kent was uncertain as to whether they
were public or private.32 He was sure, however, that the Brooklyn
Bridge franchise was private and therefore not subject to the state legis28.
29.

Symposium, supra note 2.
H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 13-68.

30. Id. at 191.
31. Any other view they considered inconsistent with republican principles. Id. at 191.
See also id. at 192 for a similar contrast.
32. Id. at 182-83.
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lature's interference. Yet by the mid 1840's both the courts and the legislature agreed that the franchise was a public function.33 Similarly, in
the absence of a settled conventional understanding city officials were
not at all sure about the scope of their own "public" responsibilitiesHartog shows, for example, their difficulty in deciding whether they
could appropriately undertake to supply the city with water." 4
The public/private problem Hartog demonstrates so well goes beyond the logically arbitrary nature of the particular distribution. A
more interesting point is the inevitable incoherence of the basic distinction itself. As one illustration ofthe dilemma, city officials assumed they
were free-indeed, obligated-to exercise their police powers to protect
the "public interest," but not entitled to interfere with the free market;
yet the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate activity kept collapsing. For example, the commitment to avoid intruding into the market seemed to mean that the city should not contribute to monopolistic
behavior. Therefore butchers leasing stalls in the public fly market were
told they could not stifle competition by claiming space in perpetuity or
by holding more space than they could actually use.3 5 But when Council members decided to defer to the private market in bread by ceasing
to regulate bread prices, deregulation actually led prices to rise beyond
the reach of the poor, and also allowed large grocers to drive their less
powerful competitors out of the market. In short order the Council reversed its earlier decision, finding itself in the paradoxical position of
intruding into the free private market in order both to protect the "public" that could not afford high prices and also to preserve the market's
supposed freedom. Public decisions inevitably affected market outcomes, and market outcomes could not be divorced from public concerns. As Hartog states the point, "the insistence on separating public
and private spheres that fueled their discomfort with price regulations
and market rules made it impossible for them, as guardians of a public
sphere, to refuse to maintain [regulatory] institutional structures identical with the public welfare." 36 There was then, as now, no logical
solution.
Hartog's description of the city's street planning provides a wonderfully graphic illustration of the same problem. By the first decade of
the nineteenth century land could fairly easily be considered as for the
33. Id. at 248, 256-57.
34. Id. at 148-50. The utter manipulability of the categories becomes abundantly clear
again when Hartog describes court opinions designed to establish judicial control over municipal
acts. Always stating that the decisions as to public/private were obvious and self-evident, courts in
fact demonstrated how free they were to choose either category. For example, water could as easily
be considered private as public. Id. at 228.
35. Id. at 151.
36. Id. at 152.
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most part properly in the hands of private owners, an object of private
right, while streets were an object of public responsibility. City officials
undertook that responsibility with more than usual zeal. Earnestly attempting to provide a suitably "public" and republican conception of
street planning, officials imposed on the city a uniform grid of straight
rectangular blocks. 3 7 In theory this grid could imply no political favoritism and it provided a perfectly systematic framework within which the
exercise of purely private rights could take place. In effect, it spatially
replicated the imagery associated with the free market: the public
sphere provides a fixed and completely neutral framework of rules,
within which a competitive market freely functions.
Ironies abounded, however. The decision to design a "neutral"
grid system as opposed to some other scheme could never be wholly
neutral, for like any public planning it inevitably affected the course of
the city's economic development. 3" Moreover, it could only be accomplished through the extensive exercise of the city's expropriation powers, and little deference was afforded to the supposed "private rights" of
individual property owners who objected. Hartog describes some city
residents hurling cabbages at the city's surveyors as they went about
implementing the city's "public" and "neutral" plan. 3 9
Moreover, the same plan which angered some enriched others.
Uptown real estate became more valuable, and the scheme created a
bonanza for speculators. In other words, new rights were created as
others were destroyed, and there was no way to distance the city's decisions from the market in Manhattan real estate4" -the latter was a
function of the former. The publicly structured framework and the private market were indistinguishable. 4
Eventually courts tried to place at least some limit on the extent to
which private investors could capitalize on public decision-making,
thereby attempting to retain some conceptual boundary between public
action and a private market. Speculators selling land, it was decided,
could not retain the rights to areas where streets were to be laid for the
sake of cashing in on the future compensation award. This practice was
considered double-dipping-too much an attempt to treat a public process as an object of private advantage. 4 2 But the line between doubledipping and simply taking advantage of rising prices was not an obvi37. Id. at 158-75.
38. Id. at 163.
39. Id. at 161, 168.
40. Id. at 170-71.
41. This is still a fundamental point about the relation between city planning and property value. See Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Control Through LandUse Regulation, 60 MINN. L. REv. 883 (1976) and Michelman, Property, Utilityand Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
42. H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 173-74.
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ous one, and in effect simply obscured the extent to which the market in
city real estate was inseparable from the process of city planning.
B. Social Conflict
More than most legal historians, Hartog tells a story that is about
social action as well as legal categories. Hartog's wry description of
doctrinal change is nicely done, but even better, and more exceptional,
is the description of how city officials acted in light of their own self
perception-as in the way they planned the city streets. Occasionally
Hartog also points out that the social/political context was one of conflict rather than unanimity. For example, the Brooklyn Ferry franchise
pitted upwardly mobile Brooklynites against the established upper class
of Manhattan. 4 3 However, although the reality of class power and conflict is conceded, for the most part it plays a relatively minor role in
Hartog's account. 4 4 The effect is to imply that there may really have
been a single identifiable public purpose to be served, rather than winners, losers, and alternative visions of political and economic life. That
false impression is the key danger of largely omitting the details of social history from any historical account.
The development of the waterfront is one case in point. Hartog
suggests that this development was basically good for the city, and development takes on a kind of abstracted neutral value. 45 It is not necessary to anachronistically charge corruption, however, it is necessary to
point out that some benefitted more than others from the distribution
of waterlots; without some description of that social reality the account
seems oddly incomplete. In fact, many who received land grants from
the city were already among the city's wealthiest families, and this continued to be true even after the Revolution, when the theoretical wedge
had supposedly been driven between public and private. Extensive city
grants were given to Peter Goelet, William Dodge, Robert Lenox,
W.H. Kissam, William Havemeyer, W.H. Webb, The Rhinelanders,
the Lorillands, James Roosevelt, Cornelius Vanderbilt, the
Scherwerhorns, and J.J. Astor-all of them already powerful men of
property. Some, like Astor and Goelet, tried to distance themselves
from politics, but other beneficiaries of the land grant policy like the
Rhinelander brothers, were office-holders.
Furthermore, with the expansion of the public sphere more of the
costs of filling in and developing privately owned waterlots were assumed by the city and fell on taxpayers, as supposedly "public" ser43.
44.
45.

Id. at 240-58.
See, e.g., id. at 37 n.14.
See, e.g., id. at 66, 68.
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vices. Then, when it was evident that conditions once attached to titles
had not been fulfilled by owners, so that titles were cloudy, city landowners pressured the state legislature to pass a law in 1865 which allowed them to get good title by payment of a small sum. Later, the
Department of Docks had to buy back some of the land from the grantees at a high appraised market value.4 6
Again, the point is not to claim corruption, but rather to point out
that despite all the conceptual changes that had taken place, the social
reality was still one of immense privilege. The transition from pre- to
post-Revolutionary New York City was marked by a good deal more
class continuity than change. Basically, the winners stayed winners,4 7
and learned to manipulate the language of public and private to their
own advantage at least as effectively as they had the language of morally sanctioned hierarchy, with its old unity of property and
sovereignty.
This continuity also meant that alternative visions of social life
were excluded. After the Revolution there was, at least for a fleeting
period, some hope that the triumph of republicanism would not mean
large scale commercial development, but rather a more equalitarian
and thoroughly participatory society. New York had a long history of
radical, often evangelical republicanism; after the Revolution its expression gained new intensity.4 As Hartog seems to suggest, one of the
effects of the conceptual split between public and private may have been
to contain and diffuse the radical potential within republican thought.
46. These details of the city's grants can be found in the fine old history of wealthy
American families, G. MYERS, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 114-18 (2d ed. 1936).
47. See generally E. COUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION 1760-1790 (1981). G.
JAHER, THE URBAN ESTABLISHMENT (1982), E. SPAULDING, supra note 10. The New York federalist

elite in many cases formed close alliances with ex-Loyalists, with whom they shared a fear of mass
rule and of the equalitarian impulses of radical republicanism generally. By virtue of that alliance,
even many ex-Loyalists retained much of their pre-Revolutionary status and influence. See W.
DANGERFIELD, CHANCELLOR ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON OF NEW YORK at 196-202 (1960); M. JENSEN,
THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at
271 (1967); S. POMERANTZ, NEW YORK: AN AMERICAN CITY 1783-1803, 83-92 (2d ed. 1965).

48. There has still been relatively little scholarship on the transformation of republican
theory after the Revolution in light of liberal, laissez-faire ideas. See Shalhope, Republicanismand
Early American Historiography,39 WM. & MARY Q. 334, 347. Hartog's work makes a valuable
contribution, but there is still a good deal more to be known. The real question was the interpretation of republican virtue: did it derive from the economically static egalitarian community bound
together by a shared moral vision, or from the freedom of the industrious individual to pursue

economic gain, thereby bringing wealth to the nation and new opportunities to her hearty, enterprising citizens?
For the problem of interpreting republicanism generally, see Berthoff, Peasantsand Artisans, Puritansand Republicans, 69 J. AM. HIST. 579; E. FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY
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In Hobbsian terms, the people alienated their sovereignty.4 9 The abstract state replaced the participatory community, squashing the vision
of an equalitarian, anti-commercial township model of social life. Notably, this process seems in New York City to have been carried out
quite quickly, and also within the city itself. Once its public and private
sides were well recognized, New York City lost its potential as a true
community. 5 °
One example of the suppression of alternative social visions can be
found in Hartog's own recent account of the Harriet ("Pigs in the
52
Streets") case, 5 first described in PublicPropertyand PrivatePower.
At an abstract level the question was whether pigs roaming at large in
the streets were a public nuisance, so that their control fell within the
public's expanding police power. There were other dimensions to the
question, however. Upper class city residents objected to pigs because
they were dirty scavengers, dangerous, and prone to offend ladies and
gentlemen by mating in plain view. On the other hand, for the lower
class residents who kept them, pigs represented a hold-over of semirural self-sufficiency and yeoman independence. Because they were
scavengers, pigs were a cheap source of protein, and their removal represented one more step toward the creation of an urbanized environment, with a lower class dependent on the wages of an industrialized
53
economy.
This does not represent an argument about economic necessity. In
fact, despite the law, pigs were not effectively removed from the streets
until they were implicated in the cholera epidemic at mid-century, and
economic development proceeded despite their "irrational" presence.
Rather, it illustrates the extent to which the abstract notion of the public sphere has to be understood by reference to its concrete applications.
Here an upper class vision of city life was in conflict with a lower class
vision. While it is now hard to get access to the full content of that latter
vision, except for the desire for cheap meat, at least it may have contained some vestige of the old republican spirit. At any rate, the supposed "public interest" in pig-free streets actually concealed deep social
divisions.
49.
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tion, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 329 (1985) at 467-69; A. KATZ, MYTHOLOGIES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTA-

TION (1983) (unpublished manuscript).
50. Again, this is the main contrast between Hartog's perspective and that of Frug. See
Frug, supra note 15.
51. Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 899.
52. H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 140-42.
53. Hartog, supra note 51. There were other complexities to this case as well, not especially relevant to the point about social conflict and competing worldviews.
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CONCLUSION

Outlining the problems of incoherence and of social conflict introduces new questions: the message, in fact, contains its own contradictions. On the one hand, the split between public and private is described as contingent and indeterminate, ultimately collapsing into
incoherence. Yet, on the other hand, at some level it works-it justifies
continued privileges, and also leads public officials to govern in a new
mode, with an expanded range of activities. Similarly, while the change
in vocabulary does little to alter the city's basic social structure, at another level society is transformed, for in a deep sense the culture is defined by the way people view their world. A society of public and private actors is simply a different society from one in which that
distinction is not recognized.
When city officials first began to describe their role as distinctly
public they seemed to be fairly self-consciously manipulating republican ideology simply for the sake of justifying their own power. Their
goal was a relatively petty one, and the ploy fairly transparent. It is
hard not to wonder whom they fooled-probably neither themselves
nor the legislators, and most other people would neither have known
nor cared what they were up to. Yet, their manipulative cleverness obviously resonated with a transformation that was taking place within the
society generally, and which deeply mattered to the American culture as
a whole.
The real challenge raised by Hartog's book, then, is somehow to
bring those points together: At one level the ideological categories of
public and private he describes are simply indeterminate words with
which to fashion legal arguments, easily used by either side to any given
conflict. His book amply illustrates that point. At another level, however, they seem to have everything to do with the nature of American
society. Hartog illustrates that point as well. He does not explain exactly how both can be true at the same time, but then neither has anyone else. Some of us often use the word ideology, and find it usefuleven essential. Nevertheless, its meaning remains elusive.

